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Abstract
Title of Dissertation:

Electronic Certificates for Ships, A LOFTy (Legal,
Operations, Fraud, Trust) Analysis

Degree:

Master of Science

Ship certificate issuance and certificate compliance are core competencies of flag and
port States respectively. Guidelines of the International Maritime Organization for
implementation of electronic certificates have been available for several years, and a
recommended deadline of April 2019 challenges stakeholders to enable ‘the electronic
clearance of vessels’ replacing paper certificates with data records.
This paper reviews the legal, operational, fraud and trust aspects of the maritime
administration transition to e-government. Change management issues for internal and
external stakeholders are covered. Case studies of legislation and implementation are
reviewed for best practices that can be adopted by maritime administrators making the
digital shift.
In particular, the paper considers an e-Document reference architecture and the “once
only principle" (OOP) as tools to support the growing introduction of ‘single windows’
for ship-shore and ship-administration data submissions. An attempt is made to build
an "e-maritime maturity index" for leading shipping nations, as a benchmarking tool.
The research confirms that global adoption of electronic ship certificates can improve
implementation of IMO instruments. The research may serve as an input document for
digital policy and implementing measures by maritime administrations and their
contractual relations with recognized organizations. It may also support risk mitigation
in implementation projects and the evolution of IMO guidelines.
Keywords: Ship certificates, electronic certificates, maritime digitization, e-

government, certificate fraud, Open register , Port State Control ,
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1. Introduction
Global shipping is rapidly heading toward an International Maritime Organization
(IMO) recommended deadline of April 2019 for the ‘electronic clearance of vessels’
in which ship electronic certificates (e-certificates) are an enabling factor1. In response
to demands from stakeholders, and following successful trials with their neighboring
maritime administration (MA), in June 2016 the Danish Maritime Authority (DMA)
announced a complete transition from paper to electronic format of all statutory ship
certificates issued to vessels flying the Danish flag. (DMA, 2016) As a leading
maritime state, an active proponent of digitization within the IMO and home to one of
the world’s largest container lines, Denmark is among the first flag States to make such
a move. Liberia was a fast follower with an announcement October 2016. (Liberian
Registry, 2016). While these developments mark a watershed in the digital agenda of
global shipping, to-date, fewer than a dozen IMO Member States have officially
announced issuance of e-certificates.

The IMO Facilitation Committee (FAL COMM) has provided Member States with
guidelines for the use of e-certificates regularly over the past five years. (IMO, 2013).
Industry is starting to appreciate that the shift from ‘documents’ to ‘data models’ can
enable remote compliance confirmation with limited involvement of the crew. Given
that stringent environmental regulations will soon further burden inspection
obligations, this would be a good thing. But shipping leadership is notoriously underinvested in digital technologies and more data-centric strategies are urgently needed.
(Informa, 2018)
1

Guidelines for the Use of Electronic Certificates FAL-5_Circ-39_Rev.2 April 2016: …According to the
Standard 3.bis, Public Authorities have to establish systems for the electronic exchange of information
by 8 April 2019. A period of no less than 12 months for transition to the mandatory use of the systems
shall be provided from the date of the introduction of such systems. A new Recommended Practice
encourages the use of the "single window" concept, to enable all the information required by public
authorities in connection with the arrival, stay and departure of ships, persons and cargo, to be submitted
via a single portal without duplication. https://edocs.imo.org/Final Documents/English/FAL.5CIRC.39-REV.2 (E).docx
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The transition from legacy paper to e-certificates presents challenges and
opportunities for a broad range of stakeholders: MAs, port state control officers
(PSCO), classification societies (CLASS), shipowners and crew, agents and vetting
companies, insurers, financial and legal advisors. All these parties rely on ship
certificate issuance, maintenance, endorsement and revision as part of their core
business processes. The e-certificate shift coincides with demands from private
companies to public authorities for broader data re-use respecting the “once only
principle” under which data is shared among related public bodies within the same
jurisdiction. In the European Union (EU) there are calls for cross-border re-use of data
stored in national databases.

For service providers, e-certificates represent a promising global market for software,
hosting and advisory services potentially worth millions of dollars. Industry sources
suggest that for a total addressable market of approximately 90,000 ‘SOLAS classed’
vessels (International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)), statutory
certificates alone represent an annual demand of 3 million certificates (seafarers add
another 5 million). But the market has not been properly sized. MA officials struggle
to measure certificate volumes due to the lack of genuine key performance indicators.
In some cases, shipowners are deemed willing to pay to ‘de-materialize’ certificates
given measurable cost savings. The European Commission (EC) estimates that
electronic data submission for the 2 million port calls annually in the EU could
eliminate 4.6 million hours of shipping sector staff work (European Commission,
2018, p. 1). In addition, secure electronic formats offer robust archiving. The challenge
for all stakeholders is to manage the change process to ensure the promised gains are
realised and avoidable pitfalls averted.

This study reviews the key concerns of stakeholders, being legality and operational
impact. Fraud which has always been a risk with paper documents, and trust which has
become more fragile in the digital are both considered in light of technology factors.
Part two reviews the history of ship certificates and current industry practice. It
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introduces the reader to the concepts of data elements and data models as distinct from
documents. Part three reviews legal challenges related to e-certificates, and illustrates
soft and hard law in the EU. A multi-country project provides important pointers on
legality and a single state initiative illustrates a pragmatic approach. Part four
highlights selected operational challenges for MAs to digitize their business processes.
An in-depth analysis of e-government and e-certificate indicators ranks shipping
nations according to their ‘e-maritime maturity’. The need for greater data
harmonization and business process interoperability is discussed. Part five reviews the
IMO approach to e-certificates. Part six offers comparable experience with digitization
from adjacent industry sectors. Part seven covers topics of fraud and digital trust
incorporating cybersecurity. Part eight offers a vision of the future with a
conceptualization of the ‘Future Internet of Ships’. Recommendations based on the
analysis and findings are summarized in the conclusion. The paper is confined to
certificates of registration, periodic surveys, and others related to Code for
Implementation of Mandatory IMO Instruments (revised) (III Code). (IMO, 2017),
excluding log-books and seafarer certificates. The term e-certificate means electronic
ship certificates unless otherwise qualified.

Research methods used in this paper reflect the global scope and evolving
technological landscape related to e-certificates. Desk and field research have provided
a descriptive overview and analytical insights. Data was sourced from multiple formats
including journal articles, books, web-sites and stakeholder body publications. The
contemporary nature of the topic dictated a literature review primarily focused on
materials published since 2007. Qualitative analysis of source documents was
complemented by findings from extensive field research conducted through face to
face meetings with industry practitioners. The author has monitored multiple IMO
meetings and extensively reviewed IMO documents. Case studies of implementation
practices in a few countries provided understanding of key legal and operational issues.
Identities from field study activities have been masked and general conclusions have
been drawn.

13

2. Ship Certificates Going Electronic
This section reviews the history of, and different types of ship certificates. It introduces
the reader to the concepts of data elements and data models as distinct from documents.
The timeline of digital technology adoption in society at large is juxtaposed with
maritime certification instruments to illustrate the digitization lag. In closing, the EU
standard for e-documents as a frame of reference for e-certificates will be introduced.
Figure 1 provides a visualization of the inter-dependent elements in the shipping value
chain. Ship certificates fall within the ‘Regulation’ layer. (Ramboll & CORE, 2017, p.
9) Whether a ship certificate is paper or electronic will impact the business models,
competencies/processes in the other parts of the value chain given that the technologies
and infrastructure needed to use either format differs. Enforcement and insurance
represents the public and private sector spheres that rely on the certificate as evidence.
While this paper does not follow this construct to the letter, most of these segments
will be considered, to the exclusion of insurance.

Figure 1: Shipping Value Chain

Source: Ramboll & CORE
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Ship certificates, be they paper, portable document format (PDF) or purely electronic
are essential documents testifying the seaworthiness of vessels, allowing them to trade.
Ship certificate issuance and cancellation, endorsement, acceptance, inspection and
control are core competencies of IMO convention parties and/or contracting
governments, flag States and port States respectively. Statutory certificate issuance is
provided by the MA or their sub-contracting service provider, typically CLASS, in
which case they are referred to as Recognized Organizations (ROs). A key stage of the
vessel inspection process by a third country PSCO is verification that all certificates
and documents of the vessel are in good order.
Historically, certificates have been issued on paper, carried physically on board the
vessel and furnished by the crew to the PSCO upon request (see photographs in
Appendix 1). Certificate deficiencies may contribute to justification for a ship
detention. In 2018, this practice of ‘handing over of paper documents’ is largely still
in place for the vast majority of PSCO inspections, ignoring repeated calls to action to
shift to digital, including IMO guidelines from 2014. (IMO, 2014) Despite the wide
availability of smartphones which now represent 57% of the 5 billion mobile phones
worldwide (GSM Association, 2018), smartphone based tools to support PSCOs are
rare, with the Indian Ocean MOU being one the first to offer such. (Indian Ocean
MOU, 2015) Barriers to technology adoption are aptly summarized by FAL COMM:
“…countries still maintain requirements which run contrary to these facilitation
efforts, because of historical precedents, commercial inertia, difficulty in adjusting the
methods of their control bodies, or ignorance of solutions that have been developed
elsewhere.” (IMO, 2013, p. 2)
The practice of registration certificates (certificates of ownership) serving to
authenticate ownership of vessels emerged in the XVII century. In the Anglo-Saxon
world, vessel registries started with the United Kingdom Shipping and Navigation Act
of 1786. Vessel details were provided by shipowners to customs officers in their home
port, with each ‘certificate of registry’ numbered and entered into a registration book
being the Port Register. Copies were sent to the central registry referred to as the
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‘Board of Trade’. (Watt, 2014, p. 9). Much as today, certificates contained details of
the vessel, ownership, original master and reason and date of closure of the registry.
Subsequent transactions, including mortgages and change of ownership were recorded
on ‘port certificates’. Historical records confirm that a similar approach was used in
the British Colonies including Canada as well as the Baltic, Italian and Spanish
shipping regions. (MUN, 2018).

Certificates of ownership remain the first document of public record for a ship.
Depending on the practices of the flag State in question, upon registration a shipowner
receives statutory certificates which are proof of ownership, allocated to the vessel
making it subject to that jurisdiction with respect to safety regulations, security,
crewing, etc. There are two initial documents: the Certificate of Registry which is
evidence of ownership and nationality of the ship and includes ship particulars (name
of the ship, the date of construction, the gross and net tons, length over all, and length
between perpendiculars, breadth, draught, registry and flag, call sign or code number,
names of owners and master) and the transcript of Registry, a publicly accessible
document which includes the ownership details and a history of any mortgages or liens
against the vessel. Appendix 2 provides a sample Certificate of Ownership from the
Kingdome of the Netherlands. When the vessel is sold, the registry issues a Certificate
of Deletion. (Sullivan, 1999, p. 85) With the Certificate of Registry, the ship is granted
the right to ‘fly the flag’ of the country, which affords diplomatic, consular and naval
protections and services. The flag also confers rights related to the country’s territorial
waters, and the implications of the rules of war. (Watt, 2014, p. 7) Appendix 3 is a
graphical representation of the ship registration processes as a flowchart from the
Liberian Registry, which is indicative of general industry practice.

Under the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Art.217
(Enforcement by flag states), flag States are obliged to ensure that all vessels registered
under their flag, comply with international rules and standards, laws and regulations.
(International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, 1982, p. 216) In this context, the MA

16

issues various certificates as documentary proof of compliance with relevant national
laws and IMO instruments which the shipowner, operator and master must have
available ‘onboard’. The list of certificates and documents required to be carried on
board ships as at 2017 is distributed over four separate IMO publications: FAL.2/
Circ.131/ Corr.1; MEPC.1/ Circ.873/ Corr.1; MSC.1/ Circ.1586/ Corr.1 and LEG.2/
Circ.3/ Corr.1. These various other certificates are issued either by ROs acting on
behalf of MAs, or by MA staff, acting as surveyors of their own national fleet. The
same staff can also act as inspectors of third country vessels for port State, to confirm
compliance. Table 1 summarizes the main groups of certificates (RINA, 2015)

Table 1: Certificate Groups by Issuer with Examples
GROUP
Ship Certificates

ISSUED BY
Flag State / RO

Class Certificates
Equipment Certificates
Ship Documentation

Class
Flag State/ RO
Owner, Builder

Log books, Records
Crew Certificates
Insurance

Crew / Master
Other Authorities
Insurance Companies

Cargo and Holds

Shipper, Operator

EXAMPLES
Load Line,
Document of Compliance,
International Safety Management
Hull, Engine, Operation
Voyage Data Recorder
Stability booklet,
Safety plan,
Mandatory operational routines e.g. SOPEP,
SMPEP etc.
Deck, Engine, Drills
Master, Officers and Ratings, Medical
Liability,
Pollution
Cargo information,
Dangerous Goods Manifest,
Gas free certificate

Source: RINA

Depending on the size & type of the vessel, the master will have several dozen
certificates, (varying in length from one to several pages each), to document
compliance. This includes statutory certificates for various conventions inter alia
SOLAS, International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL), International Load Line Convention (ILLC), Maritime Labour
Convention (MLC), as well as all supporting certificates such as CLASS, fire-fighting

17

equipment (FFE), life-saving appliances (LSA) and other various equipment. (DMA,
2016) For example, the DMA, issues more than 60 different types of statutory
certificates covering all categories of vessels: cargo ship, passenger ship, fishing
vessels and other (ie barge, offshore), all electronically. Appendix 4 is an indicative
list of certificates which may be issued by a flag State administration.

To paraphrase Maher, ship certificates are credentials that allow the holder to exercise
certain rights and privileges, being those provided to registered ships under the
relevant flag (USA Patent No. 6,125,349, 2000). They are documents which represent
certified assertions about the ship. These assertions are certified by the flag State
administration and/or their RO. Typically the assertions pertain to a vessel possessing
certain characteristics or sufficient equipment, systems, standard operating procedures
or processes in practice so as to satisfy the criteria of the relevant regulatory
requirements. The assertions can be presented in the form of prose sentences, but much
of the information is factual data. Such data has been defined by the ISO/IEC 2382-1
standard as “A re-interpretable representation of information in a formalized manner
suitable for communication, interpretation or processing.” (IMO, 2013, p. 68) Each
IMO instrument which generates certification provides sample templates as a
minimum data capture, on which Member States can and do model their documents.
Given the lack of official standards, MAs are not prevented from adding their own
requirements.
The state event which validates these assertions is the ship inspection or ‘survey’.
Whether the certificate is paper or electronic, the data is entered into the relevant field
of the template (becoming a data element) in order to complete the form (a data
record). Historically, free text, (often handwritten) was added to the certificate by the
surveyor. The IMO refers to ISO 9735 V4. Part 1 for a definition of data elements
being “ A unit of Data described in a data element specification.” (IMO, 2013, p. 68)
The form completion is testified by the signature of the authorized person, being a
nominated signatory of the MA or their RO. Hand-written signatures are still used
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extensively. While they can make paper documents auditable, (being verifiable posthoc), the time and energy necessary to trace handwritten signatories, compared to a
certified digital signature, favor the latter. E-certificate data elements are protected
from tampering by means of a ‘digital signature’ which replaces the handwritten
signature. The digital signature is a cryptographic mechanism that ensures the data is
unique and only accessible to third parties through the use of public information being
the public key infrastructure.

The certificate inspection process for PSC is closely defined and has been recently
updated, as detailed below. Although e-certificates are clearly mentioned in these
instructions, it is interesting to note that direct submission of data by the
shipowner/operator to the public authorities in anticipation of the port call is omitted:
2.2.3 On boarding and introduction to the master or the responsible ship's officer,
the PSCO should examine the ship's relevant certificates and documents required
by the relevant conventions, as listed in appendix 12 part A.
PSCOs should note the following:
.1 certificates may be in hard copy or electronic form;
.2 where the ship relies upon electronic certificates:
.1 the certificates and website used to access them should conform
with the Guidelines for the use of electronic certificates
(FAL.5/Circ.39/Rev.2 and Corr.1);
.2 specific verification instructions are to be available on the ship;
and
.3 viewing such certificates on a computer is considered as meeting
the requirement that certificates be "on board";
.3 when examining 1969 International Tonnage Certificates, the PSCO
should be guided by appendix 10; and
.4 when examining certificates or documentary evidence of seafarers issued
in accordance with STCW 1978, the PSCO should be guided by appendix 11; the
list of certificates or documentary evidence required under STCW 1978 is also found
in table B-I/2 of the STCW Code. (IMO, 2018, pp. Annex 1, p.10)
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Paper certificates presented to PSCOs for verification during inspection can create
challenges to comprehension. In contrast, e-certificates as ‘digital credentials’ and the
data elements therein can be presented for inspection remotely for interpretation and
validation to the computer systems of the relevant authorities. In the transition away
from paper, the ‘certificate’ is in effect replaced by an electronic data record of data
elements, presented in a data model defined by the terms of the certificate template,
protected by a digital signature that ensures data veracity. Transmission of the
certificate(s) can be either by the shipowner or his authorized delegate, be it crew or
ship management company.

During various field visits conducted since early 2017, the author found that in
countries which pride themselves on fully digital e-government services in health,
education or taxation, the MA is seemingly locked in a pre-digital time-warp, as
illustrated by the following anecdotes. In an EU country, a senior MA official
confirmed regional personnel retained thousands of survey records used as the basis
of certification, in paper files in filing cabinets with no back-up. His primary data
security concern was not a cyber-attack but rather the risk of fire. A leading RO senior
staff member confirmed that large quantities of paper certificates were regularly airmailed or couriered to their clients in the Far East. In one leading flag State, senior
staff regularly downloaded PDFs received from ROs, printed them onto paper and
stored them in binders in the office presumably for want of a convenient electronic
records management system and/or under-developed e-skills. Finally, a senior partner
in a leading maritime law practice, was puzzled by the need to convert to digital
formats, since the veracity of certificates was delegated to ship management
companies with no apparent need by legal counsel to validate their existence, neither
physically nor electronically. Such due diligence methods would be quite unheard of
in other industry domains. Clearly this user community has business practices that predate the internet era.
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The IMO is long on generic descriptions and short on a programme to systematically
dismantle barriers to the adoption of e-certificates. Factual data on the actual volume
of certificates issued and specific blocking factors are not readily available. The ecertificate defintions as per the guidelines are as follows:

1.

Certificate means a document issued by an Administration or its
representatives that is used to show compliance with IMO requirements and
used to describe operating conditions, manning crewing requirements, and
ship equipment carriage requirements. The term ""certificate"" does not
include publications, manuals, instructions, or ships'' logs used to record
ongoing operations;

2.

E-certificate means a certificate issued in an electronic format; accessible for
viewing through or via a website or, a ship’s computer, or a printed version of
such certificate; or other digital media and used to create a printed version.
Printed version of e-certificate means a paper certificate print-out produced
from the e-certificate;

3.

E-signature means data in electronic form which is attached to or logically
associated with other electronic data to serve as a method of authentication of
the issuer and contents of the electronic data;

4.

Unique tracking number means a string of numbers, letters, or symbols used
as an identifier to distinguish an e-certificate issued by an Administration or
its representative from any other e-certificate issued by the same
Administration or its representative; (NB: there is no agreed global standard
for the tracking numbers) and

5.

Verification means a reliable, secure, and continuously available process to
confirm the authenticity and validity of an e-certificate using the unique
tracking number on board the ship with the source issued by the
Administration or its representative that issued the certificate.

(IMO, 2014, pp. Annex 1-2)

All of this is important because the scope of IMO related ship certificate issuance is
growing steadily. According to a report by the Russian Federation (RU) submitted to
the IMO, their analysis of more than fifty IMO statutory instruments confirmed that
the number of mandatory certificates and documents has grown from 25 entries in
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1990 to 60 in 2004, and more than 100 in 2017. (Russian Federation, 2017) The IMO
Global Integrated Shipping Information System (GISIS) Surveys and Certification
module lists 62 certificates. (IMO, 2018). RU expressed concern that the transition to
e-certificates will not alleviate this expansion trend, but rather may exacerbate it.
Coincident with the expansion of certificate scope, attempts to harmonize or
standardize terminology and syntax in a globally uniform way to be used in certificate
documents and more broadly in Maritime Single Windows (MSW) remains unfinished
(more on this below).

In shipping, documentary evidence, rather than data, remains the modus operandi to
prove statutory compliance. Ships’ crew show a PSCO a piece of paper or an electronic
file of a document, they do not ‘share data’. This is the very heart of the administrative
burden, and it reflects the IMO reporting obligations legacy. Staying with the same
time period selected by RU, a benchmark to digital technology shows clearly the
backwardness of paper ship certificates. From the perspective of digital media research
fellow Cotton, during the 1990-2017 period, decisive trends have been massive
increases in computing power, (also available on diverse mobile devices), massive
content digitalization, and ever-increasing on-line connectivity coverage and capacity.
These three global societal shifts have until now, left ship certificates largely
unchanged. Breakthroughs yet to be fully exploited include : artificial intelligence
including narrative software agents, ‘internet of everything’ telemetry and telematics
(satellites, remote sensing, drones etc.), robotics and virtual robotics. (Cotton, 2018).
Table 2 provides a timeline, tracking major global technology breakthroughs alongside
the issuance of IMO instruments. It clearly illustrates that although multiple enabling
technologies have been available to the shipping industry for some fifty years and
many pre-date SOLAS, they have been pretty much ignored by IMO stakeholders,
notably the MAs and their ROs.
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Table 2: Global Technology & IMO Instrument Timeline
YEAR
2016

TECHNOLOGY MILESTONES
Cognitive Computing / IBM ‘Watson’

2012
2009
– 10

Occulus Rift, Virtual Reality
Bitcoin 2009
Apple I-pad 2010

2007

Apple I-phone 2007 /
Android O/S 2007

2005
– 06
2004

Google Earth GIS 2005

2002
– 03

Facebook/ Social Media 2004
LENOVO (China) buys IBM PC 2004
Skype 2003

2001

Wikipedia 2001

2000

Global Positioning System /
SMS Text Messaging USA
World 1st 3G mobile license in Finland
Mobile phones affordable in OECD
Microsoft Windows 98
Google Search Engine 1998

1999
1998
1997
1996

Secure Electronic Transaction SET
Standard (VISA/MASTERCARD)
Google starts indexing the Web

1995

Microsoft Windows 95
GPS fully operational
JAVA programming language
Bluetooth Wireless standard
E-commerce websites start
Play Station in Japan
Adobe Acrobat 1.0 PDF format

1994

1993

1992

Palm Pilot
SMS Text Messaging

SHIPPING REGULATIONS
DMA announces all ship e- certificates
Liberia /ClassNK announce e-certificates
Cape Town Agreement 2012 (Fishing Vessel safety)
STCW 2010 Manila Amendments (EiF Jan/12)
Hazardous & Noxious Substance (HNS) Protocol
2010
Code for Implementation of Mandatory IMO
Instruments (revised) (III CODE) 2007
Nairobi Wreck Removal Convention 2007
SUA Convention 2005 / SUA Protocol 2005
Riyadh MOU 2006
Ballast Water Management Convention 2004
International Safety Management (ISM) Code2002
EMSA created by Regulation (EC) No 1406/2002
PAL Protocol 2002
FUND Protocol 2003
Bunkers Convention 2001
Antifouling Convention 2001
Canada Shipping Act 2001
Maersk et al launch INTTRA 2001
Black Sea MOU 2000
OPRC / HNS 2000

EDIFACT ISO 9735 Revised (current version)
Mediterranean MOU 1997
MARPOL Protocol 1997
Caribbean MOU 1996
SOLAS Agreement 1996
London Convention Protocol 1996
LLMC Protocol 1996 /
HNS Convention 1996
UK Merchant Shipping Act 1995
STCW 1995 ( EiF Feb 1997)
International Safety Management (ISM) Code

UK Merchant Shipping (Registration of Ships)
Regulations 1993 / Tokyo MOU 1993/
CSC Amendments 1993 / SFV Protocol 1993
IMO Subcomm on Flag State Implementation 1992
CLC Protocol 1992 /
FUND Protocol 1992

Source: B.Cosgrave compiled from various sources incl. in references
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Table 2 (cont’d): Global Technology & IMO Instrument Timeline
YEAR
1990
- 91
1988
- 89

TECHNOLOGY MILESTONES
WWW/ Tim Berners Lee 1990
Digital Audio Broadcasting 1990
LINUX O/S 1991
UN EDIFACT ISO 9735 1988

1987
1984
86
198183
1978

Nordic Mobile Telephony 900 in DK
APPLE Mac PC 1984

1974
-76

Internet 1975

Satellite Television 1983
IBM Personal Computer 1981

Digital Camera 1975
1972
- 73

Mobile Phone 1973
Graphic User Interface (GUI) 1973
INTEL 4004 1972

1970
– 71

Laser Printer 1971

1966
– 69

Arpanet/Internet 1969
Electronic Data Interchange 1968

SHIPPING REGULATIONS
US Oil Pollution Act 1990
PAL Protocol 1990
OPRC Convention 1990
SOLAS Protocol 1988 /
LL Protocol 1988
SUA Convention 1988 / SUA Protocol 1988
SALVAGE Convention 1989
UN Ship Registration Convention 1986
UNCLOS 1982/
Paris MOU 1982 / Vina Del Mar Agreement 1982
STWC 1978 (EiF April 1984)
SOLAS Protocol 1978
MARPOL Convention 1978
SAR Convention 1979
PAL Convention 1974 / PAL Protocol 1976
SOLAS Safety of Life at Sea Convention 1974 (EiF
CLC Protocol 1976 / FUND Protocol 1976 /
LLMC Convention 1976
Space STP Protocol 1973
Intervention Protocol 1973
MARPOL Convention 1973
Collision Regulations (COLREG) 1972
CSC Convention 1972
London Convention 1972
Special Trade Passenger Ship Agreement 1971
Nuclear Convention 1971
UK Merchant Shipping Act 1970
Tonnage Measurement of Ships Convention 1969
Intervention Convention 1969
CLC Convention 1969
Load Lines Convention 1966
Facilitation Convention 1965

Source: B.Cosgrave compiled from various sources incl. in bibliography

Given a growing reliance on certification compliance, global shipping needs an ecertificate approach which is holistic, covering legal, organization, semantic and
technical aspects. Sadly neither the IMO, nor any other shipping standardization body
has provided one, nor recommended any existing model. Research for this paper
identified the ”e-Documents Reference Architecture” from the Interoperability
Solutions for Public Administrations (ISA2) program of EC Directorate General of
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Informatics (EC DG DIGIT) as a best practice model. (EC, 2018) The ISA2
frameworks lend themselves to the analysis of e-certificates and will be referred to
hereafter. The life-cycle of e-certificates can follow the flow illustrated in Figure 2.
(JoinUp, 2016) A graphical depiction of the full ISA2 reference architecture is
provided in Appendix 5.

Figure 2 : E-Documents Reference Architecture: E-Document Lifecycle

Source: European Commission ISA2

This section has provided an introduction to ship certificates and placed the ongoing
digital transition in perspective. E-certificate creation in shipping is currently
heterogeneous, including disparate formats from multiple actors with only the bare
minimum of standards universally agreed. Methodologies for e-certificate exchange,
preservation and deletion, are left to MAs and ROs to be managed independently. In
the 21st century, statutory certificates predominately issued on paper or in PDF format
(itself a 25 year old technology) are sent across the globe, replicated and /or copied for
sharing between parties. In such a format, data elements contained therein, cannot be
extracted independently of the entire document, resulting in highly cumbersome
validation. The following sections will delve deeper into the legal, operational and
fraud and trust aspects of electronic certificates.
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3. Legal Aspects of Electronic Ship Certificates
This section reviews the legal aspects of electronic ship certificates being principally
public administrative law and legislation governing evidentiary documents in
electronic form. MAs in leading shipping nations will be assessed for their ‘e-maritime
maturity’. An in-depth look at multi-country and single state implementations will
cover pending ‘hard law’ instruments. These initiatives reflect ‘first movers’ frustrated
with the lack of progress in the protracted IMO consensus model.

Legislation enabling MAs to operate digitally is typically non-maritime specific,
stemming from national policy to adapt administrative law to digital methods and
instruments, commonly referred to as ‘e-government’. Since the start of this century,
governments globally have seized the opportunity to improve service quality and
efficiency through exploitation of on-line services. The e-government trend gained
momentum in the early 2000’s as a result of a public administration shift from paperbased to digital procedures following the broad adoption of “e-commerce” in the
private sector. E-government is now globally well established. As a result, the
academic research and policy debate have moved beyond administrative law
amendments to current topics of inter-operability, higher-order sophisticated services
and legal questions pertaining to admissibility of social media as evidence in trials
(Westlaw, 2017). An in-depth analysis of the full range of e-government implementing
acts, the law of electronic transactions and the law of evidence is beyond the scope of
this paper. The rest of this section is focused on e-government legislative changes as
they relate specifically to e-certificate deployment by MAs.

Under European law, the state of the art for e-document solutions (of which ecertificates are a specific case) starts with the public policy principles of ‘once only’
and ‘digital by default’. Best practice indicates that e-maritime legislation and
regulations should be elaborated respecting these two principles to the greatest extent
possible. Figure 3 illustrates the scope of legal matters to be considered for e-document
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issuance in a government context as per the EC ISA2 model. (JoinUp, 2016) The legal
framework encompasses requirements and constraints.

Figure 3: E-Documents Reference Architecture: Legal View

Source: European Commission ISA2

Legal requirements include administrative procedure legislation and e-government
legislation, which as noted are widely adopted since the early 2000s. The former, is
typically a legacy legislative instrument and the latter a public law instrument to reflect
advances in private law. Journal articles treating e-government legal questions are
rather dated. An authoritative study from 2001 by Eifert et al. was commissioned by
the Netherlands in anticipation of their administrative law revision. (Eifert, Girot,
Groothuis, & Prins, 2001) It focused on national public administration legislation to
permit electronic services, typically as part of pan-agency, pan-department programs.
The study found implementation varied based on government openness to innovation,
country regulatory traditions and the digital legacy of technology integrations into
government processes. Key questions included defining equivalence for terminology,
such as ‘written’ and ‘signature’ from paper for electronic documents.

E-government first movers included the United States (US), United Kingdom (UK),
Australia and Canada. Of these countries, only the UK has an e-certificate initiative
underway. The US started with e-government in 1993 albeit in a non-coordinated way
with statutory regulations adapted at the specific organization level. The US does not
yet issue ship e-certificates. Leading EU countries included Finland with the 2000 Act

27

on Electronic Services in the Administration and the Netherlands with amendments to
the Dutch General Administrative Law Act as from 2001. Finland is participating in
the ‘The Once Only Principle’ project (TOOP) (details below). German federal law
allowed e-government to launch initially without a change to the public administration
procedure law (Art. 10 VwVfG), albeit it was soon discovered that thousands of
specific regulations stipulated written documents, hand-written signatures, or physical
presence and had to be adapted accordingly. Norway implemented legislation in 2001
to facilitate electronic documents under both public and private law. (Eifert, Girot,
Groothuis, & Prins, 2001, pp. 59-60) Both Germany and Norway are now issuing ship
e-certificates. As for the Dutch, their national fleet of 1,600 vessels operate with paper
certificates and plans from 2016 for e-certificates are yet to be put into effect. This
situation is somewhat incongruous with the Netherlands having endorsed the initial
IMO e-certificate proposal in 2005, being home to the largest port in Europe in
Rotterdam and the Paris MOU in the Hague and the Dutch government as egovernment forerunner since 2001.2

Legal constraints for e-documents include personal data protection and archiving
legislation. An example of the former is the EU General Data Protection Regulation
2016/679 (GDPR) regulating the processing of any personal data relating
to individuals by an individual, a company or an organization in the EU. (EC, 2018)
The GDPR has set a world standard obliging personal data-holders to protect and
secure it. (This is relevant to crew e-certificates). The EU Implementing Rules for
Document Management provide a scope echoing the e-document lifecycle in Figure 2
above. Archives are defined as “… current records, intermediate records and definitive
archives…” For effective implementation, archiving requires good document
management organization, adequate staff training and modern electronic document
management and archiving systems. (EC, 2009).

2

2003 'Modernizing Government's program', the ICT and Administrative Burden (ICTAL) program,
the 2002, ‘Better Government for Citizens and Businesses’(B4 program) and since 2001 the Ministry
of Interior and Kingdom Relations ICT Unit (ICTU), in charge of coordinating e-government
development. (EC, 2015)
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Two of the most thorny legal issues related to ship e-certificates, being signature
validity and issuer validity, have been treated comprehensively in EU directives. 1997
saw the publication of the “European Initiative in Electronic Commerce” to ensure
security and trust in electronic communication. A European framework for digital
signatures and encryption was followed by the 1999/93/EC Directive on a Community
Framework on Digital Signatures. (OJEU, 2000) Directive 1999/93/EC was repealed
with the entry into force 1 July 2016, of the Electronic Identification and Trust Services
(eIDAS) Regulation. eIDAS is important and useful since it has harmonized a series
of digital signatures, seals, time stamps, registered delivery, and website
authentications across national borders, eliminating many areas of confusion.
(Notably, IMO e-certificate discussions were blocked by questions over signatures,
seals, and stamps for years.) As a result, EU e-signatures have legal equivalence to
physical counterparts. E-IDAS generated new trust centers to ensure that online
signatures and certificates are authentic (Liptak, 2016). Various national legislative
instruments to support e-government conversion have been implemented in EU
Member States.3

E-certificates may be implemented with a soft law or hard law approach. Typically
countries start with soft law and if that fails to generate the desired behavior from
stakeholders, then hard law will follow. Such has been the case at EU level with the
soft law instrument, the Reporting Formalities Directive 2010/65/EU (RFD). The RFD
applied to all ships calling at 1,200 ports in 23 Maritime EU Member States. The goal
to establish a harmonized national maritime single window (NMSW) for facilitation
in each country was consistent with the ‘Digital Agenda’, a high-level EU policy

3

Spain:

Law 11/2007 on Citizens' Electronic Access to Public Services (LAECSP)
National Interoperability Framework Royal Decree 4/2010 (NIF RD 4/2010) (id-lawpartners, 2010);
Law 39/2015 the Common Administrative Procedure of the Public Administrations. (Kingdom of Spain, 2015).

Bulgaria:

Law for the Electronic Document and Electronic Signature repeated amendments between 2001 and 2010.3

Compliance is regulated by the Communications Regulations Commission (Government of Bulgaria , 2010).
Neither the Bulgarian MA nor Spanish MA issue ship e-certificates.
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promoting e-government. RFD was supported by significant funding (€37M from
2012-15), engagement by most MAs and industry stakeholders and had sophisticated
program management. However it became a case study of what can go wrong with soft
law. By the 2015 deadline, only two countries were ready, four others almost ready
and remainder not ready at all. RFD ultimately failed due to unclear directive text;
various legal frameworks; disparate digital systems, (lack of) standards and (too much)
legacy; all compounded by MAs caution and lack of coordination (even within national
jurisdictions). (PWC Panteia, 2017)
The RFD was subjected to a legislative ‘fitness test’ 2016-17 followed by a proposal
to repeal the soft law and implement hard law with the binding ‘eMSW Regulation’
(Regulation establishing a European Maritime Single Window environment). (EC,
2018). The new eMSW regulation has its legal basis in Article 100 (2), of the Treaty
of Rome. Although it does not formally mandate e-certificates, eMSW will require
maritime transport operators to submit data via a common interface software,
complying with a comprehensive data set, the scope of which will include all EU
relevant reporting obligations and international legal acts (read IMO instruments)
related to a port call. Although not impossible, it would be completely impractical for
the data gleaned from various ship certificates to be transposed from paper certificates
manually to the eMSW. Hence this new regulation will provide a de facto shift to ecertificate adoption by at least all ships calling at EU ports. (EC, 2018, p. 10)

Despite the frustrations of the RFD, it is encouraging to see that the highly topical EU
funded TOOP project of cross-border data-sharing between government agencies,
includes a use case for ship and seafarer certificate data exchange between eight
countries4, referred to as the Maritime Pilot Area 3 (PA3). (Graux, 2017) PA3
addresses a smaller scope of data between fewer countries than the initial RFD failure.
It includes MA national database interconnection via systems integration on a platform

4

Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Italy, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway

30

for on-line ship or crew certificates issuance by flag States, and data-sharing with
relevant parties: port authorities, police & border guards etc. (Dimitriou, 2018)

TOOP is particularly relevant to this study, given its in-depth analysis of legal
challenges from the perspective of participating MAs. General legal principles covered
included: data protection, data sovereignty, purpose limitation, liability, and their
impact on the application of the once-only principle at the cross-border level and
finally subsidiarity (irrelevant outside the EU). A systematic analysis of source
documents included: EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, General Data Protection
Regulation, Single Digital Gateway Regulation, e-IDAS Regulation, PSI-II Directive,
Services Directive and the e-Commerce Directive. The PA3 legal analysis referred to
the IMO at the global level, the EU at the regional level and respective national
legislations. From the IMO, emphasis was placed on SOLAS 1974, STCW 1978 and
Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic Convention 1965. (AFS 2001 and
MARPOL 1973 conventions were outside PA3 scope.) The EU covered directives
RFD 2010/65/EU, Safe Sea Net 2002/59/EC and the EU Decision 70/2008/EC for a
paperless environment for customs and trade. In its conclusion, TOOP highlighted the
persistent ambiguity in IMO around ‘original form’ that perpetuates the PDF format
as a way to satisfy the ‘very non-digital age’ IMO obligation to have documents
available onboard. (Graux, 2017, p. 46)

The comprehensive scope of legal principles and requirements reviewed by TOOP
determined the following compliance needs for the maritime pilot. These findings
highlight the advantages of e-certificates and are important learnings for MAs
preparing to issue them.:
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Good Administration: nothing maritime specific, the existing practice of
captain’s presentation of paper certificates undergoes a change to a digital
mode, with added logging and audit controls, which are an improved level of
transparency and allow for post hoc control.



Privacy, data protection and confidentiality: crew certificate data needs to
comply with relevant data protection laws. Data processing for certificates is
based on legal necessity clearly indicated in IMO, EU and national laws. Once
again, e-certificates provide improvements over paper with respect to
traceability of data access, and allows for more control since when necessary,
data access rights can be subjected to appropriate levels of authorization, which
is considered a bonus for personal medical data.



Lawfulness and compliance: The legal basis is IMO Conventions, EU
Directives and national laws; for the PA3 pilot, electronic access to certificate
data is subject to permission of the captain. However this can be substituted by
the MA or the shipowner or their authorized party.



Control: in PA3, the captain controls authorization of certificate data transfer
to authorities, acting digitally rather than physically; TOOP suggests that if
certificates are not stored locally on the vessel, authorized access of the captain
can be built on national identification tools in compliance with, for example
the e-IDAS regulation, but this is not obligatory. The risk of abuse, with
captains accessing certificates not of the vessel of which they are master, is
mentioned, as a consideration for necessary identity access.



Value, validity and evidence: Certificate value and validity are determined
according to IMO Conventions and EU Directives. Crew certificates are
validated by their issuer through unique identification numbers.



Security: The evidence exchange mechanism shift (from paper-based to digital
processes), requires competent authorities and any other party with whom they
are engaged, to apply ‘appropriate technical and organizational measures’
relevant to the risk. PA3 suggests pseudonymization and encryption of
personal data together with systems which ensure confidentiality, disaster
recovery and business continuity which are standard operating procedures for
any well-functioning information technology department or service provider.
It also suggests reliance on high-level security requirements in IMO
Conventions and EU Directives. (Graux, 2017, pp. 48-51)
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In contrast, FAL COMM e-certificate guidelines are highly prescriptive with respect
to the instrument itself and less stringent on process and verification. MAs are
instructed their e-certificates should have specific features such as validity and
consistency of format and content with the relevant IMO instrument; be tamperproof
(protection from editing, modification, revisions); have a unique tracking number, a
printable and visible symbol that confirms the source of issuance and verification
websites; be controllable via the safety management systems as per Sec. 11 of the ISM
Code; e-signatures to comply with authentication standards adopted by the
Administration. In the event the IMO becomes more ambitious, the TOOP framework
may be relevant as a model for comparable regional initiatives.

The legal implications of the TOOP multi-country initiative can be compared with a
single country implementation, that of Denmark. On 20 June 2016, the DMA
announced that as from 24 June 2016 the Kingdom of Denmark would issue all ship
certificates covering SOLAS, MARPOL and “other relevant conventions”
requirements electronically, in alignment with the IMO Guidelines as per
FAL.5/Circ.39. DMA took the precautionary measure to ensure that the e-certificates
retained the ‘look’ of paper documents even if it was impossible to retain the ‘feel’.
Danish e-certificates bear the coats of arms and a facsimile signature of the authorized
signatory, being the inspector, together with the ‘stamp’ of the DMA when viewed on
screen or a printed facsimile (the certificate is uniquely electronic). This was done to
appease the longstanding ‘signature, stamps and seals’ debate which had blocked FAL
COMM meetings for about a decade. Verification is available using the certificate
unique tracking identification number (TIN) via the webpage www.dma.dk, accessible
by public internet with personal computers or internet enabled mobile (smart)phones,
or alternatively by email or by direct telephone. DMA e-certificates are tamperproof
due to encryption and digital file signature protection.
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DMA instructions to Danish flagged vessel owners, operators and masters, allow that
e-certificates be presented either electronically on a computer screen or in a printed
colour version, and each vessel is invited to retain the announcement letter to share
with PSCOs. (John, 2016) The obvious question is how did the Danes make this
happen before any other IMO member state? Is there a particular legal framework that
allowed this ‘giant leap forward’? The simple answer is no. The Danes, tired with the
decade-long IMO timeline, with characteristic pragmatism ran a pilot trial to make
sure that it could work, and then deployed. Prior to the launch, the DMA business
processes resembled the early twentieth century. Paper certificates were printed,
stamped, signed and sent around the world to wherever the vessel that needed the
updated document happened to be. A pilot project started in 2013 with one passenger
ferry company operating between Denmark and Norway. The outcome was positive,
with a confirmation that e-certificates could replace paper versions. The DMA did not
abandon the IMO process, rather they acted on IMO guidelines, as so far, too few top
shipping nations have done5. Throughout the transition, DMA enjoyed very strong
support from Danish Shipowners, the trade association, whose members were eager
for the benefits of faster certificate handling, real-time updates to ship management
systems and company databases, increased security and more reliable authenticity.

The legal status of ship e-certificates is a national question for flag States and port
States. From the scholarly literature, it is clear that at least all OECD countries have
made the shift from paper based administrative law to digital administrative law. For
developing countries, the UN E-Government Survey has been tracking progress
periodically since 2008. Complete online interaction is now globally possible,
supported by model legislation, extensive implementation models, project
management methodologies, sector specific or geographic benchmarking mechanisms,
all available in the public domain. Effectively any MA can offer all its services on-line
with legal certainty by referencing international and national legal instruments.

5

Denmark, Germany, India, Korea, Liberia, Norway, Panama, Singapore
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In summary, the legal considerations of e-certificates include national administrative
law enabled for on-line service delivery and e-government. Research show that this
has been the regular mode of operation for governments globally for at least the past
decade, (if not two), including Emerging and Frontier Market (developing) countries.
Various legal principles apply to ship certificates when they go electronic, such as data
protection, data sovereignty, purpose limitation, and liability, but countries that have
made the transition or are underway with trials have found these to be manageable.
IMO Member States have at their disposal a plethora of guidelines and draft text to
support changes to regulations and legislation if required.

Legal challenges for MAs in the areas of national law and public policy are driven by
their status as a member of the relevant international organization, being the IMO, their
ratification of international conventions, and the relative importance of the shipping
sector to their national economy. (Ramboll & CORE, 2017, p. 16) E-certificates apply
in many domains often with responsibility shared between the MA and other
departments such as national security, transport, labour, environment, justice etc. Egovernment legislation and regulations covering the legality of electronic
communications from legal persons to administrations and vice versa are now well
entrenched. While ubiquitous ‘always-on’ connectivity has generated ‘digital trust’
challenges, corrective measures such as GDPR and eIDAS are available. Given the
shared responsibility, a review of country e-government indicators together with
maritime specific metrics can be combined to indicate ‘e-maritime maturity’ as a
measure of preparedness for ship e-certificates issuance. This will be elaborated in the
next section.
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4. Operational Aspects of Electronic Certificates
This section examines selected operational aspects of e-certificate implementation as
a comprehensive treatment is beyond the limits of this paper. It reviews the stages of
e-government through which MAs undertaking digitization transition. It seeks to
identify potential early adopters via ‘e-maritime maturity” measures. Important
blocking factors of non-harmonized basic data and weak business process
standardization are considered with illustrations.
A classic change management challenge albeit on a global scale, the ongoing egovernment transition in MAs reflects technology and societal trends. E-government
change processes have been formalized in academic literature, with two leading
models, the Public-Sector Process Rebuilding (PPR) model dating from 2006 and the
Layne and Lee model dating from 2001. (T.Almarabeh, 2010, pp. 30-31) Any MA
transitioning from paper to e-certificates will go through these steps explicitly or
implicitly.

The PPR model identifies four phases of e-government as follows:

i)

Cultivation: horizontal and vertical integration with government, front-end
system, adoption and use of intranet;

ii)

Extension: extensive use of intranet, personalized web-interface for
customer processes;

iii)

Maturity: abandoning of intranet, accountability and transparent processes,
personalized web-interface for customer processes;

iv)

Revolution: data mobility across organizations, application mobility across
vendors, ownership of data transferred to customers

The positioning of most IMO Member State MAs is typically in the first phase
‘Cultivation’. PPR has a government to citizen (G2C) bias and as such is less relevant
to MAs, which are serving business stakeholders, so more attention will be paid to
Layne & Lee.
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Layne & Lee also identify a four stage ‘growth process’. (Heeks, 2015) IMO Member
State MAs are typically still in the first ‘catalogue’ and ‘transaction’ phases. Order
intake (requests for certificates and/or surveys) are online to a limited extent, while in
the vast majority of countries certificate issuance remains paper-based. If digitization
has occurred it is typically limited to the paper format certificate issued as a PDF, not
an electronic record of data elements in a defined data model. This is the case whether
or not the MA is outsourcing to ROs.

Figure 4: Layne and Lee E-Governance Model

Source: Heeks

During a 2017 market research study carried out among Paris MOU members with
delegated functions to ROs, the author found virtually none had direct computer
integration with their ROs, and typically received ‘e-certificates’ in PDF as email
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attachments. In Layne & Lee, this could be categorized as vertical integration, albeit
loosely defined as the ‘links’ are not proper application program interfaces established
through system integration between the information technology platforms of the
respective parties. Horizontal integration including ‘Real one-stop shopping’ for
shipowners is only available from a handful of MAs, although IMO FAL5-Cir.39,
Rev.2 challenges all Member States to reach that stage by April 2019.

The EU ISA2 offers an organizational view with key business processes. Stakeholders
are principally concerned with ‘Business Capability’ for exchange and access to edocuments, especially ‘system-to-system back-office solutions’, in other words direct
transmission of e-forms from stakeholders to MAs and ‘no touch’ computerized data
exchange between government departments – the once only principle put into practice.
(JoinUp, 2016) Very few MAs operate like this today, rather most rely instead on
physical or electronic document submission, not data submission; this is the
breakthrough anticipated from PA3 and the EC eMSW. According to this ‘best
practice’ architecture, the ‘state of the art’ MA must offer user-oriented solutions (etools like software and websites) to shipowners/operators, masters, PSCOs to manage
their interaction with the MA online. MAs must implement solutions for e-certificate
storage and managing access rights granted to users.

Figure 5: E-Documents Reference Architecture : Organization View

Source: European Commission ISA2
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Examples of e-government initiatives, going back at least 20 years are so widespread,
that MAs still operating with paper procedures, could justifiably be seen as deliberately
blocking global shipping from the transparency, timeliness and traceability that egovernment is universally recognized to enable. Furthermore, inadequate e-tools may
allow shadowy industry players to avoid regulatory oversight. To dispel such notions,
MAs need to get going. Many regional and global e-government initiatives can serve
as models for ship e-certificate implementations, such as the United Nations Public
Administration Network (UNAP), Department of Economic and Social Affairs
(UNDESA) and Division for Public Economics (UNDPE) cooperation on egovernance indexes. These platforms and others at the EU level, include
comprehensive interoperable services, frameworks and tools. (JoinUp, 2016) The very
impressive UN E-Government Survey 2018 ‘Gearing e-Government to support
transformation towards sustainable and resilient societies’ should become obligatory
reading for IMO FAL COMM. (UNAP, 2018)

E-government is a dynamic way of delivering public sector services, which is now
extensively measured, for example based on the On-line Services Index (OSI) from
within the United Nations E-Government Development Index (UNEDI), and internet
penetration in the country. (Raconteur.net, 2017, pp. 8-9) Although UNEDI is a wellestablished and frequently cited UN indicator, it is nowhere visible within the IMO
digitization agenda. While this may in part be explained by a G2C bias in UNEDI and
a G2B bias in the IMO, the indicators of enabling technologies are relevant to both
client constituencies and both organizations. As an illustration of the IMO digital gap,
the Country Maritime Profiles (CMP)6 updated in June 2018, included parameters such
as gross domestic product (GDP), shipping connectivity index, and happiness index,
however made no mention of the UNEDI nor any other e-government measure, nor
internet connectivity, nor smartphone/mobile phone penetration, the latter two factors

6

CMP serves as the basis for technical assistance needs from IMO Member States, and an upgrade of
the tool is under development for delivery in 2019.
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being essential tools to support the shift of IMO instrument implementation,
governance and enforcement into the digital age. (IMO, 2018, p. 9)
In an attempt to assess maritime ‘e-maturity’ for leading shipping nations, the author
has consolidated various relevant indicators. Data has been gathered for IMO Member
States including the top twenty ‘e-government’ countries7 plus the fifteen leading large
commercial ship-owner/ ship-registry countries; overlap reduces the total to twentyeight countries. Only four of the ten largest ship-owning countries (Japan, Singapore,
South Korea and US) and three of the seven largest ship registries (Liberia (US-based),
Marshall Islands (US-based) and Singapore) were among the top-ranking UNEDI
score countries. Denmark, Norway and Singapore, all leading e-government,
shipowning and flag States countries are strongly committed to e-certificate
implementation as testified by their 2017 MOU. (Maritime and Port Authority of
Singapore, 2017) Republic of Korea and Norway actively share best practices at the
IMO. (Republic of Korea, 2018) (Norway, 2018) It would seem reasonable to expect
all top e-government country MAs to be among e-certificate ‘early adopters’, however
this is not the case. Beyond the tripartite announcement mentioned, coordination is
limited and there is no concerted plan to meet the 2019 deadline.

Table 3 attempts to show which IMO Member MAs live up to their UNEDI score with
a compendium of e-maritime indicators, in a first attempt at an ‘e-maritime maturity
index’. ‘E-Maritime maturity’ can be inferred by (i) the time-lag (if any) between egovernment announcements, and ship e-certificate announcements, (or the lack
thereof); (ii) GISIS publishing activity (or lack thereof, which is the majority)8; and
(iii) engagement in FAL COMM working groups. Correlation of the data shows that
MAs significantly lag far behind their national e-government policy agenda with few

7

Israel and Slovenia are excluded, being too small in shipping.
It is recalled that during the 30th IMO FAL COMM meeting in September 2014, members agreed that
the GISIS "Survey and Certification" module was to be adapted to add references to Administrations
issuing e-certificates, including the list of e-certificates issued by each Administration and any
additional information, as considered necessary by the Administration, and to make that information
accessible to the general public.
8
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exceptions. OSI maturity overall is not matched by e-certificate issuance. E-certificate
announcements are patchy. For Paris MOU and Tokyo MOU countries, the table takes
as an announcement proxy, the date of the Third Joint Ministerial Conference
declaration inferring e-certificate commitments.9 Unfortunately, the language is rather
vague and notably, the host nation Canada has not yet committed to issuing ecertificates. (Transport Canada, 2017) A key recommendation of this paper, and area
for further research is to elaborate such an e-maritime maturity index for all IMO
Member States as a tool for themselves and their stakeholders, particularly the ROs.
Such an index would be an invaluable tool to identify barriers and enablers for
progress. For each country the following data is provided:
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)
vii)
viii)
ix)
x)
xi)
xii)
xiii)
xiv)

2 Letter Country code (International Standards Organization, 2018)
Number of Ships flagged DWT unless * no. of vessels from MA
(United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2018)
Number of Ships owned DWT unless * no. of vessels from MA
(United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2018)
On-lines Service Index (OSI) ranking / * UNEDI as per Raconteur
On-line Service Index (OSI) score
Internet Users Penetration 2016 as per Raconteur
Digital Trust Environment (Bhaskar Chakravorti, 2018)
National e-Government policy platform announcement
MA accepts e-certificate announcement/ 3rd Joint Ministerial participation
MA issues e-certificate announcement (See Appendix 6)
GISIS MA specimen certificate available 20180917 : Red = NA / Green =
Available with number of certificates
GISIS MA certificate verification link available 20180917 : Red = NA /
Green = available
Number of ROs declared on GISIS
IMO FAL COMM e-certificate Working Group meetings attended

‘Safeguarding Responsible and Sustainable Shipping Joint Efforts for Enhanced Safety,
Environmental Protection, and Working and Living Conditions for Seafarers Inter-regional Action to
Eliminate Sub-standard Shipping and Promoting a Level Playing Field” May 3-4, 2017, Vancouver,
Canada
9
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Table 3: E-Maritime Maturity Indicators of Leading Shipping Countries
i

ii

iii

iv

v

vi

eGovt

Digital
Trust
NA
2.97
2.73
3.13
2.17
3.29
3.47
2.96
2.83
3.64
2.95
2.85
3.66

e-Certs
accepted
20170504*
20170504*
20170504*

DK
18,139
39212
1
96
GB
16,658
46384
1
1 93 1996
AU
na
4190
2
0.978 85 1995
SG
127,644 103,583
3
0.971 83
CA
na
9082
4
0.956 89
20170504*
KR
13,974
77277
5
0.942 86
20170504*
FI
na
2022
6
0.942 93 2000
20170504*
NZ
na
290
7
0.942 89
20170504*
FR
na
51464
8
0.942 86 1998
20170504*
NL
na
18116
9
0.927 94 2001
20170504*
US
53984 10
0.927 89 1993
20170504*
ES
420*
2455 12
0.913 82
EE
na
348 13
0.891 91
20170504*
AE
15045 14
0.891 92
DE
107119 15*
0.840 88
3.30
20170504*
SE
Na
6259 15
0.876 93
3.45
20170504*
JP
34,648 223615 16
0.876 91
3.15
20170504*
IT
14,929
19750 17
0.869 66
3.23
NO
18,054
59380 18*
0.804 98 2001
3.43
20170504*
MX
na
1442 20
0.847 45
2.26
MT
108,729
2923 30*
0.797 80
NA
20171205
RU
Na
22219 35* 0.731 71
2.73
20170504*
GR
72,196 330176 43*
0.579 65
NA
20170504*
CN 265,280* 183094 63*
0.768 52
1.73
20170504*
PA
335,313
1471 99*
0.333 45
NA
20170801
ID
18,273
24852 116* 0.362 20
2.83
20170504*
MH
237,807
1442 156* 0.029 20
NA
LR
223,655
215 170* 0.239 9
NA
2006
`* UN-EGDI ranking / Compiled by B.Cosgrave based on cited sources
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e-Certs
issued
20160624
20180207

GISIS
Cert.
29

20161130

20180208

20170213

62
1

58
19

14
20170516
20171026

273

20170801

20161012

18
10

GISIS
verify
29

# of
ROs

FAL WG
39 41 42

12
8
15
7
4
7
5
16
6
6
6
6
13
5
4
4
18
6
16
3
18
8
26
20
14

39 41 42
39 41
41 42
39
39 41 42
39 41 42
39 41 42
39 41 42
39
42
42
39 41 42
39 41 42
39 41 42
39 41 42
39 41 42
42
41
39 41 42
39 41 42
39 41 42
41 42
41 42
39 41 42
39 41 42

User engagement and adoption are paramount for successful implementation of ecertificates. So far this has been a big flop for e-certificates as illustrated by very low
penetration. Operational efficiencies from G2B e-procedures should be of great
interest to shipowners and their agents, given their challenging financial situation.
However benefits need to be financially measurable and better communicated. The EU
has enumerated benefits from Maritime Single Windows being 22-25 million staff
hours in 2020-2030 or EUR 625 to 720 million in the EU 28 Member States from reduction
in administrative burden for shipping operators. In addition environmental benefits include
modal shift from road to waterborne traffic of 3,395 million ton-kilometers in 2030
resulting in an overall reduction of 1.88 MT of CO2 emissions relative to baseline. All
told, around EUR 145 million of indirect benefits over 2020-2030. (EC, 2018, p.
Legislative Financial Statement p.3) PA3 has enumerated potential timesaving per each

PSC inspection of 1.5 to 3 hours from online certificates checked in advance. Such
Master/crew time-saving will allow greater concentration on safe navigation. Lower
detention rates due to invalid certificates which can be corrected in advance, should
also lead to cost avoidance, however this is as yet unquantified.
Based on other industry examples, multi-country change management programs are
greatly facilitated by personal relationships among stakeholder C-level leaders, the
fewer the better. When leaders are aligned, major industry shifts can be achieved
during short timeframes, typically two years. E-certificate ‘thought leaders’ might be
found in the commercial ships category of 50,155 vessels (see Appendix 7). This
category is largely controlled by the ten largest ship-owning communities, and the
seven largest flags. A target group of fifteen stakeholder representatives could make a
head-start with e-certificate deployment on about 60% of the world fleet. A publicprivate partnership between these flag States and shipowner communities, could help
accelerate adoption, and realize benefits rapidly especially given that a few countries
(DK, KR, NO, SG) are already onboard.

43

5. The IMO Approach to Electronic Certificates
In the IMO, Interim guidelines on e-certificates were issued initially 18 Apr 2013,
revised to become Guidelines on 7 Oct 2014, and revised again 20 Apr 2016 when
FAL 40 adopted the Guidelines for the use of electronic certificates
(FAL.5/Circ.39/Rev.2). Acceptability and interoperability are core concerns of users,
hence the Committee also approved the draft amendments to resolution A.1052(27) on
Procedures for port State control (FAL 40/6, Annex 2), clarifying the validity of ecertificates during a port State control inspection. A Correspondence Group, the IMO
FAL COMM Working Group on Electronic Means for the Clearance of Ships (WG9)
is tasked to drive adoption with some 30 members and observers. This group is still
deliberating, several years after forming, and has not yet adopted a program
management approach to systematically identify and dismantle barriers. There is no
evidence that FAL COMM have considered e-certificate reference architectures such
as that of ISA2, nor are there key performance indicators to monitor deployment
progress. Concerns that technology is under-exploited in the IMO working procedures
is a constant refrain, repeated in a recent paper from a dozen Member States (Antigua
and Barbuda, 2018) These concerns seem justified, in light of WG9 progress thus far.
Notably, in the recently elaborated FAL COMM terms of reference there are no
explicit references to digitization, modernization of administration nor e-government
among its seven objectives. In thirty-two pages of instructions, the internet is
mentioned only once, under “…5.11 Correspondence groups should utilize modern
communications technology, such as the Internet, as much as possible….” (IMO,
2018, p. 11)

TOOP PA3 offers a framework against which the IMO efforts can be benchmarked.
TOOP includes pilot projects, a generic federated Once Only Principle architecture,
and investigates drivers and barriers. Clearly this program management approach is
missing in FAL COMM. IMO focuses on the document itself, defining key terms.
However there is no commitment to a e-certificate data model standard and a deadline
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for data element standardization (2021) was only adopted reactively after alarms were
raised (see below).
According to the ISA2 model (Figure 6) a global e-certificate standard should be
comprehensive including: an identifier scheme, an e-document meta-model, an e-file
meta-model, container meta-model, archiving meta-data, descriptive meta-data,
routing meta-data and transactional data. (JoinUp, 2016) WG9 discussions have
touched on topics such as e-certificate content, meta-data and e-signatures. Document
management systems for multiple certificates for a single ship are left to the MAs and
their ROs, which hampers standardization.
Figure 6: E-Documents Reference Architecture: Semantic View

Source: European Commission ISA2

Where standards have been elaborated, fragmentation and lack of interoperability are
common, or else standards are simply ignored. For example, the ISO 28005 Security
Management Systems for the Supply Chain – Electronic Port Clearance (EPC) is a
‘Maritime Single Window’ standard. It is comprised of two parts: ISO 28005-1:2013
message structures and ISO 28005-2: 2011 core data elements. It is developed by the
technical committee: ISO TC 8/SC11/Intermodal and Short Sea Shipping, with the
secretariat provided by the Korean Agency for Technology and Standards. Published
in March 2013, and revised in 2018, it is not clear where and when this standard has
been adopted by IMO Member States, except Republic of Korea (see above).
Encouragingly, it has been used for an eMSW pilot within the European Maritime
Safety Agency (EMSA). The most blatant renunciation of standards found by this
author dates from 2011 and the FAL.5./Circ.36, in which it is clearly stated:
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“2.3 No standards defined: These guidelines do not define any particular standard for
implementing a single window. They point to different internationally recognized
standards that are available and that can be utilized as appropriate.” (IMO, 2011)

This standards avoidance is inconsistent with the historical feedback from industry
stakeholders, such as the findings from an EC public consultation which elicited over
95% support for e-maritime standards to be prioritized in policy implementation. (EC
DG MOVE, 2010)

Figure 7: E-Maritime Policy Implementation Stakeholder Feedback

Source: EC DG MOVE

A laudable effort to tackle disparate standards across various shipping functional siloes
comes from the International Taskforce on Port Call Optimization (ITPCO) out of the
International Harbour Masters Association (IMHA). Their project to harmonize port
entry data consolidates standards from the International Hydrographic Organization
(IHO),

International

Standards

Organization
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(ISO),

World

Meteorological

Organization (WMO), the International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and
Lighthouse Authorities (IALA) Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO)
and GS1. ITPCO / IMHA deliverables cover functional data definitions for static berth
conditions and dynamic state events in the berthing process. These data standard
definitions were developed after strong pressure exerted on port authorities by the oil
majors and carrier lines. Useful deliverables were announced in 2018 based on work
ongoing since 2006. The IMHA proudly states that definitions will be incorporated in
the next version of the Mariners Handbook (NP100). (IHMA, 2018)

The fact that multiple data systems, for example GISIS, EQUASIS and THETIS
(among others) operate alongside each other, would be less problematic if at least the
meta-data definitions could be harmonized, otherwise too much energy is expended to
submit the same data in different formats to various platforms, as is currently the
practice. Recalling the definition of an e-certificate as a data file comprised of data
elements certified by the relevant authority, operational issues related to data
harmonization are critical. While standards have emerged for various parts of the
extremely broad and complex business processes entailed in shipping, these are unable
to work inter-operably, if from the outset they are conceived, designed and
implemented based on heterogeneous data element definitions. The multiplicity of
datasets and unharmonized data elements in use has been recently flagged to the IMO
with a call to elaborate a Common Maritime Data Structure (CMDS) consolidating the
plethora of industry data element definitions (see Figure 8). (BIMCO, 2017)
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Figure 8: Examples of Heterogeneous Data Standards in Shipping
Data
Element
Ship Name

Call Sign

IMO
Number

MMSI
Number

Comments

Description
Given name in the
ship registry
Call sign of the ship:
sequence of letters
and numbers , unique
to each ship, by
which ship can be
identified, usually in
radiocommunications
Unique ship
identification number
assigned by Lloyd’s
Register/Fairplay in
accordance with IMO
Res.A.600(15)
Identifier used by
maritime digital
selected calling (DSC),
automatic
identification systems
(AIS) and certain
other equipment to
uniquely identify a
ship or a coast radio
station
Any other
information related
to ship identity

DATA ELEMENT IDs
UN
EDIFact
C222:8212
ShipID.ShipName
(Name of
Ship)
C076:3148
(call sign)
ShipID.CallSign
ISO 28005

ShipID.IMONumber

C222:8213
(IMO
Number)

WCO
ID
T005

IACS R75

SHIP_Name
Type
(253)
SHIP_Call_Sign

T006
SHIP_IMO_Number

Type
(253)

ShipID.MMSINumber

ShipID.Comment

Source: BIMCO

MAs typically outsource part or all of their certificate activity to one or more ROs (see
Table 3). Although an in-depth review of RO business practices is highly relevant to
this study, length restrictions of this paper preclude it. Alternatively a consideration of
CLASS standardization activity is provided. The International Association of
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Classification Societies (IACS)10, regarded as best practice operators, has expert
groups for data models, e-certificates and cyber-security. IACS elaborated the Unified
Data Exchange Format (UDEF) with a twenty page specification document in June
2001, commonly referred to as ‘Recommendation 75’ (Rec. 75). The standard was
completely revised in Feb. 2015, corrected in Feb. 2016 and Revision 2 was issued
Dec. 2016. Rec.75 refers to thirty-eight certificate types, fewer than the RU report and
GISIS. Although presented to IMO as document MSC 95.21.6, it has not been adopted
as a standard by FAL COMM for their e-certificate guidelines, and it is not universally
adopted by MAs that outsource to IACS members. (IACS , 2017).



10

American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), Bureau Veritas (BV), China Classification Society (CCS),
Croatian Register of Shipping (CRS), Det Norske Veritas Germanischer Lloyd (DNV GL), Indian
Register of Shipping (IRS), Korean Register of Shipping (KR), Lloyd's Register of Shipping (LR)
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6. Digital Initiatives in Adjacent Sectors
Multi-country, multi-lingual, public/private initiatives in other domains suggest that
IMO Member States can do far better in advancing along the digital agenda, with
significant advantages to be gained. Examples from container shipping, and customs
clearance, illustrate that ship e-certificate deployment is anywhere from five to fifteen
years behind these adjacent business processes.
In 2001 with the advent of e-commerce, six leading carrier lines11 joined forces to
build a common platform for the electronic exchange of booking and shipping
instruction data between shippers and carriers, branded ‘INTTRA’. Since then, the
platform has grown dramatically to now serve some 30,000 shippers on 60 carrier lines
and Non-Vessel Owning Common Carriers (NVOCCs) in 200 countries. (Recalling
that 50,000 commercial vessels are owned/flagged in 15 countries, e-certificate
deployment faces a fraction of the complexity.) Varying connectivity solutions among
users is accommodated by INTTRA with a range of options for data submission and
review including online via the World Wide Web; secure website via an application
program interface and the EDIFact standard. There is also a document conversion
process; a software application that can be installed on the shipper/forwarder’s laptop
or desktop computer, via which data entered into the home system is transmitted to
INTTRA as an e-mail attachment. (INTTRA, 2018)

In the customs domain, the EU Directorate General for Taxation and Customs Union
(DG TAXUD) project to implement a Unified Customs Code in all EU Member States
which is underway since 2013 has chosen to follow the WCO lead focusing on data
elements, harmonizing them, and using data models appropriate to the reporting
requirement. This allows to clearly identify those data elements needed for each
verification use-case. Data elements can be re-used and shared between interested
parties, in a more flexible manner than documents.

11

CMA-CGM, Hapag-Lloyd, Hamburg Sud, Maersk, Mediterranean Shipping Company, United Arab
Shipping Company
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Referring back to the RU analysis of IMO certification obligations, although the report
identified various challenges it missed the point that ‘data’ could be part of the
solution. There is no mention of ‘data’ nor ‘data element’ in their report, rather it is
proposed that a new ‘dedicated legislative tool’ might be helpful, however adopting
such an instrument through the IMO process would be extremely protracted at best and
interminable at worst.

Successful implementation of the FAL.5/39 guidelines can release PSCOs and crews
from the drudgery of paper certificate review. How the released PSCO time and energy
will be re-directed to new duties, (e.g environmental compliance) and whether this will
result in higher standards of shipping safety and pollution control is the promise to be
realized from the digitization process. Since the guidelines were issued, IMO Member
States and stakeholders have been grappling with their ramifications. With the
experience of first movers, the IMO has sufficient evidence that e-certificates deliver
tangible benefits to issuers and users. Attendance to FAL COMM working groups is
not an indicator of genuine e-certificate engagement or deployment. The IMO should
take more initiative to measure the e-maritime maturity of its member states, with an
appropriately constructed index that can provide stakeholders a tool to track delivery
against government commitments rather than hoping for eventual fulfilment of
ratification obligations.
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7. Fraud & Trust Aspects of Electronic Certificates
This section of the paper considers the issues of fraud and trust. It starts with data on
the frequency of certificate and documentation deficiencies to provide some scale to
the issue. The matter of fraudulent registration will be discussed based on very current
developments. Cybersecurity will be touched on for the sake of completeness, but not
over-emphasized as the subject is vast and goes beyond the scope of this paper. This
will be followed with a summary of factors to enhance trust. Finally an analysis of ecertificates as components of the “Future Internet”, the more robust and reliable
technology infrastructure than can support ubiquitous electronic operating procedures
will be offered as a vision going forward.

Figure 9: Deficiencies in Port State Control Inspections 2016

Source: IMO Secretariat
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The consistency with which ship certificates and documents irregularities (for reasons
legitimate or otherwise), arise in ship inspections justifies seeking to improve the status
quo with the latest technology. In the most recent PSC inspection data from 2016, ship
detentions for all causes represented 3.19% or 2,814 vessels out of 88,291 initial
inspections among the ten PSC regimes12, down from 3.27% in 2015. While 64.1% of
all deficiencies relate to SOLAS (excluding deficiencies related to certificates and
documents), the next most important factor at 9.8 % is ship's certificates and
documents (all instruments) followed by 5.8% due to MARPOL (excluding
deficiencies related to certificates and documents). Figure 9 illustrates the distribution
of deficiencies globally for 2016. (IMO Secretariat, 2018, p. 7)

While the instance of certificate deficiencies vary across MOUs, they are a persistent
challenge. For example, this category represent more than 6,000 deficiencies annually
recorded by the Paris MOU over the past five years and in 2016 instances increased
by 7.7% to 6,779 from 6,295 in 2015. (Paris MOU, 2017, p. 18) The Black Sea MOU
confirmed that in 2017, out of 5,112 inspections, some 3,018 inspected vessels with
21,006 deficiencies, included 1,292 or 6,15% for documents and 421 or 2% for crew
certificates. (Black Sea MOU , 2018, p. Annex p.2)

The extreme case of non-compliance is fraudulent ship registration. The UK Fraud Act
2006 Section 1(2) defines three categories of fraud: Section 2 (fraud by false
representation); Sec.3 (fraud by failing to disclose information); Sec. 4 (fraud by abuse
of position). Fraudulent ship registration and fraudulent documents relate to all three
definitions given s.2 covers false representation of ship documents and certificates to
public authorities such as PSCO and private actors such as insurers (if indeed the vessel
is insured); s.3 pertains to the legal duty of shipowner and captain to disclose
information about the vessel, which will have been falsified, and again s.4 covers
shipowner and captain as persons in a position expected to safeguard or not to act

12

Abuja MoU, Black Sea MoU, Caribbean MoU, Indian Ocean MoU, Paris MoU, Mediterranean MoU,
Riyadh MoU, Tokyo MoU, Viña del Mar Agreement and United States Coast Guard
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against the financial interests of another person – in this case, all parties in the shipping
value chain such as suppliers, crew. (Todd, 2010, pp. 2,Ch2) The practice of fraudulent
ship registration, which has been linked to piracy, is persistent and troubles several
countries.

In 2017 alone, the Democratic Republic of Congo cited 73 vessels

fraudulently flying its flag, Fiji had 91 such cases and the Federated States of
Micronesia (not an IMO Member State) had 150 fraudulent ships. IMO measures to
combat maritime fraud and illegitimate registrations include: IMO Ship Identification
Number Scheme (Resolution A.1117(30); IMO Unique Company and Registered
Owner Identification Number Schemes (Resolution MSC 160(78)); Continuous
Synopsis Record; measures to prevent ‘Phantom’ ship registration (Resolution
A.923(22) and a recommended ‘transparency’ procedure for transfer between flag
States (MSC/Circ. 1140/MEPC/Circ. 424). But these measures are deemed
insufficient, particularly when fraudsters avail themselves of new tools such a fake
websites. The urgency of the matter is summarized by IMO member states

13

as

follows: “…existing mandatory and non-mandatory instruments of IMO or the UN are
not adequate to help prevent fraudulent registration of ships…” . They are calling for
an urgent work item to address this modern-day piracy issue, albeit without explicitly
enumerating digital technologies as root cause nor possible solution. (IMO Member
States: CY, DRC, FI, DE, MO, SP, VA, 2018, pp. 1-6)
Fraud and corruption of the ship documentation process can at times find its source
within the MA. Considerable academic research has focused on the utility of ICT tools
to frustrate state corruption, providing further justification for broader e-government
adoption in the maritime sector. The team of Shim & Eom are leading here with robust
studies grounded in considerable data analysis. In their research they cite studies
confirming e-government programs as successful anti-corruption tools in Argentina,
Chile, India, South Korea and Russia, notably all important maritime countries. Their

13

Cyprus, Democratic Republic of Congo, Fiji, Germany, Morocco, Spain, Vanuatu
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methodology includes country corruption measures from Transparency International,
something to be considered in the IMO CMP. (Eom, 2009, p. 105)
The spectacular growth of internet users from 400 million in 2000 to the current level
of 4,021 Billion or 53% of global population penetration (Kemp, 2018) has been met
with a similar explosion in service offerings and service providers. The coincident
growth of data management breaches has fractured user trust and elicited belated
regulatory responses of varying severity. This new operating paradigm is referred to
as the Future Internet (FI). The FI environment is characterized by ‘…a new generation
of service (e.g. a hybrid aggregation of content and functionality), service factories
(e.g. personal and enterprise mash-ups), and service warehouses (e.g. platform as a
service). One specific service instance may thus be created by multiple service
development organizations, it may be hosted and deployed by multiple providers, and
may be operated and used by a virtual consortium of business stakeholders.” Evidence
that greater sophistication is needed comes from the escalation of ‘cyber-threats’ from
hacking in public and private sector. To ensure the trustworthiness of new services
Joosen et al. propose they be built under the confluence of software engineering,
service engineering and security engineering disciplines. (Wouter Joosen, 2011, pp.
177-178)
The FI challenges public and private sector alike. MAs must move beyond the initial
phase of e-government to deploy already widely available tools for data mining and
‘big data’ and toward ‘i-government’ which will be rooted in the ‘Internet of
Everything’ (Kamolov, 2017). An sample regulatory response is the EU Directive on
Security of Network and Information Systems (‘NIS’ Directive) which entered into
force August 2016, obliging all EU Member States to elaborate national ‘cyber’
strategies, with coverage of essential services including key industry sectors. (ENISA
, 2016) This is a policy shift from the prior focus on public sector ICT infrastructure.
For example the Republic of Cyprus national cyber strategy in 2012 makes no mention
of maritime, while the Danish Center for Cyber Security strategy from 2018 forward
has focused on six key industries including maritime. (OCECPR, 2012) (Fiedel, 2018).
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Most of the software tools widely used in society pre-date the FI, and this is
particularly true in shipping Widening digital technology adoption and co-incident
change to standard operating procedures are over-whelming the maritime private
sector which is particularly under-invested in digital systems, leaving them highly
vulnerable to cyber-fraud as their systems are weak, easily hacked and response
mechanisms almost non-existent. (Sorensen, 2018). Size is no defense, as the attacks
on Maersk in 2017 illustrated, leading to a root and branch overhaul of their
information technology. (AP Moller Maersk, 2018). Shipping has now recognized the
dangers. Based on a proposal from the US (United States, 2017), the IMO (2017)
Resolution MSC.428(98) Maritime Cyber Risk Management in Safety Management
Systems was adopted to incorporate cyber-risks within the ISM Code and make
compliance obligatory as from 2021 (and one year thereafter for audit and PSC). (IMO,
2017) A copy of the resolution is provided in Appendix 8.
However, strong resistance to change generates persistent trust challenges among MA
internal and external stakeholders. Okut-Uman identified three basic imperatives to
generate confidence in electronic media: i) Valid laws of evidence providing for the
admissibility of electronic documents and electronic signatures in legal proceedings;
ii) Electronic (digital) signatures having legal effect and validity and iii) A trusted
business environment based on public key infrastructure (PKI). (Okut-Uman, 2002, p.
11) The first two have been dealt with in part three of this paper. PKI is a generic allencompassing term referring to a suite of e-tools and methods that replace handwritten
signatures. It is complex topic, that requires an extensive technological explanation to
do it justice. The author found the most clear and definitive report on the subject to be
an UNCITRAL that covers technology and legal concepts (and runs to 114 pages). By
way of introduction, it cites: “ “Digital signature” is a name for technological
applications using asymmetric cryptography, also referred to as public key encryption
systems, to ensure the authenticity of electronic messages and guarantee the integrity
of the contents of these messages. The digital signature has many different
appearances, such as fail stop digital signatures, blind signatures and undeniable digital
signatures. (UNCITRAL, 2009) Another treatment, albeit even more technical is
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provided by Brands. (Brands, 2000) Referring again to the ISA2 model, PKI ‘building
blocks’ are illustrated in Figure 9.
Figure 9: E-Documents Reference Architecture: Technical View Infrastructure

Source: European Commission ISA2
PKI tools and methodologies are typically defined for e-government at a national level
and can be adopted by the MA. It remains to be seen whether various national tools
offer global inter-operability or whether a common standard needs to be adopted by
issuers. Mutual recognition between MAs and ROs as certificate authorities is
underway. It is debatable whether IMO guidelines qualify as an adequate accreditation
mechanism. Broader global implementation will prove this point.

Other factors influencing trust include the robustness, security and affordability of
connectivity available to MAs particularly PSCOs. Given e-certificates are targeted at
the G2B segment, affordability is not really an issue, but the argument is used
frequently by detractors. While unique mobile phone users now number 5,135 Billion
or 68% of global population penetration, service access is no longer the issue but
quality varies according to geography, driven by the competitiveness of service
providers. 2016 data for consumer connectivity in some sixty low and middle-income
countries confirms that affordability remains a challenge in two-thirds while one third
of the group has made measurable progress. (A4AI, 2017).
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A useful tool to support all maritime stakeholders in this domain would be Global
Maritime Connectivity Index (GMCI), as a complement to the e-maritime maturity
measures in Table 3. The GMCI would measure basic performance indicators for
digital connectivity in major global ports and the 200 nautical mile limit associated
thereto. In an initial phase the geographic scope should include the 100 EU ports
defined was ‘Core Ports” by DG MOVE. This will be of keen interest to EMSA.
Subsequently it could be expanded to the top 100 ports globally and eventually main
ports in the ASEAN countries and at least one major port per IMO member state. The
drivers for reliable, accessible information about digital connectivity in maritime
locations are myriad including maritime single windows, autonomous vessels,
digitized customs clearance processes, remote operational control and maintenance of
maritime equipment, and finally sea traffic management and port collaborative
decision-making. The GMDI would be of interest to ship operators, nautical equipment
vendors, policy makers and regulators. It should include multi-technology coverage
such as fixed wireless, mobile communications, satellite communications and lowpower wide-area networks. Measurement of operational parameters such as signal
strength, interference would be invaluable to ensure that the growing scope of
maritime and nautical applications and e-tools can function properly.
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8. The Future Internet of Ships
Looking forward, in a broader context, e-certificates are an enabling but insufficient
factor for the digitization of shipping as a whole, which can be referred to as the Future
Internet of Ships (FIoS), being the maritime sector component of the FI. The
digitization of ship certificates can be presented as a specific application of the generic
Future Internet Enterprise System (FInES) as elaborated by Angelucci et al. The FInES
is defined as “…a progressive implementation of a rich, complex, articulated digital
world that reflects the real business world, where computational elements, referred to
as FInER (Future Internet Enterprise Resources) will direct, act and evolve according
to what exists in the real world.” (Daniella Angelucci, 2011, p. 407) Hereafter the
FIoS is conceived as an information technology system architecture comprised of
multiple variables, e-certificates being one of them,

interacting to achieve the

digitization. The FIoS as presented here encompasses internet of shipping services
(e.g. sea traffic management voyage management and port collaborative decision
making (STM Validation Project, 2018)), internet of shipping things (e.g. smart ships
(autonomous vessels being the extreme example), smart objects enabled with
radiocommunications to facilitate remote monitored such as engines and pumps),
internet of shipping knowledge (documents online in real-time i.e. IMO GISIS
modules), internet of shipping people (digital identities for seafarers /fishers). All of
these aforementioned categories are subject to some degree of certification, frequently
with a certificate attesting to compliance. The FIoS as a technology paradigm
illustrates the shift of management, planning and execution of shipping to new
services, new tools, new software packages, new interfaces, and new user interaction
solutions.

The FIoS can be expressed as a function of Future Internet of Ship Resources (FIoSR)
which include concrete tangible things such as a ship, pump or engine, as well as
intangible things, such as training course, business process, marketing strategy, and in
some cases the tangible migrating to the intangible, such as paper ship certificates
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transitioning to e-certificates which are in effect data files. The FIoSRs can be
expressed in the following manner:
FIoSR is a 5-tuple:

FIoSR (i.e. e-Certificate) = (FID, GR, M, B, N)

defined as

follows:
FID : FInER (unique) identifiers of the FIoSR, defined according to precise
universally accepted standards (e.g. internet addresses according to the IPV6
standard; URI - Universal Resource Identifier or any ENS – entity name system);
GR: graphical representation, (e.g. GIF, 3D Model, JPEG, Video);
M: memory which can range from ROM (read-only memory) with basic info to
complex knowledge of all components, properties and lifecycle history;
B: behaviour is a functional capability of the FIoSR structured in line with profile
(IOPE – input, output, processing, effects) and model (workflows), may be selfmonitoring;
N: networking – specifications of all possible interactions the FIoS can achieve;
(Daniella Angelucci, 2011, p. 413)
Hereafter we considered a ship e-certificate using the FIoSR aspects listed above:

FID: with respect to identifiers, the transition to the use of various unique identifiers
is already underway with tracking identification numbers (TINs) used for verification
of authenticity and validity either on MA websites or via the GISIS Survey and
Certification module. At present the numbering systems used are national and not
harmonized globally. The functionality of unique identifiers can be extended when
they are linked to Internet enabled names, numbers and addresses. These properties
are governed globally by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN).14 For example, the generic top level domain name (gTLD) ‘.ship’ could be
While ICANN may not yet have allocated the ‘.ship’ top level domain, at least the
ICANN community is very aware of shipping, but perhaps for the wrong reason. On 1
14
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exploited by FIoS related websites and services. Internet addresses can be allocated
according to the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPV6) standard. Functionalities could be
extended through closer coordination between the shipping and Internet communities
however it appears that very little of this linkage work has been done so far. In the case
of the gTLD, attempts have been made since 1999 to gain management rights, but to
date the ‘.ship’ and ‘.vessel’ domain names do not yet exist (restricted rights to domain
names ‘.boats’ and ‘.yachts’ were allocated in 2016 (Domain Name Wire, 2016)).
(Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, 2018)
GR: The information contained in a ship survey report is not limited to prose nor data.
Pictures and videos are actively encouraged by PSC MOUs. The Paris MOU even has
a contest, ‘Caught in the Net’ for the most telling image of non-compliance (Paris
MOU, 2018). Hence e-certificates ideally should have graphical representation
properties. In the case of large naval architecture plans this can present storage and
behaviourial challenges. It may be relevant for shipping experts to liaise with the
ISO/IEC technical committees that govern standards for this area.
B: Behaviours of an FIoS e-certificate could include input data (CLASS parameters)
being interoperable with output data needs (port berthing details) and software tools
that manage workflows to which the vessel is subjected. Self-monitoring of the ecertificate can include alarms to the issuer (MA) and the user (shipowner) in
anticipation of expiry.

September 2016, a fire broke out in the containership CCNI Arauco, while docked in
the port of Hamburg, resulting in two containers filled with technical equipment en
route from the ICANN 56 meeting held in Helsinki, Finland to the ICANN 57 meeting
scheduled for Hyderabad, India. One of the containers which was undamaged, was offloaded to another ship and made its way to India. The other container, stuffed with
electronic office and computing kit was damaged and detained in Hamburg. Due to
maritime law, inspections by German authorities and the shipping company’s
insurance adjusters, release of the property could take several months to several years.
https://www.icann.org/news/blog/fire-on-cargo-ship-affects-it-equipment-bound-foricann57-hyderabad
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M: The memory properties of e-certificates will facilitate auditability. Standards can
support the interoperability of e-certificates with limits on certificate size if
appropriate. Memory capacity via ‘cloud computing’ can provide adequate memory
capacity for all parties engaged in global shipping. Cloud based services are making
real-time data transfer a normal business practice. Shipowners are increasing interested
to assess how they can exploit existing connectivity and messaging formats to ensure
rapid adoption of e-certificates for improved interfaces to ports and other parties in the
shipping value chain. Shipping stakeholders seek to better understand the product and
service options presented by e-certificates. CLASS are particularly interested by
maritime ‘cloud’ for internal operations and for service offerings to customers.
N: The myriad networking interactions of a paper ship certificate have been alluded
to in this paper. Once fully digital, the e-certificate functions may expand for example
to include embedding them as supporting documents in smart contracts using
distributed ledger technologies for marine (re)insurance, or ship finance. The FIoS ecertificate will be enabled for interactive state events, with data being stored, shared
and computed based on the particular stage of the shipping business process, or the
demands of a particular user.

The FIoS would entail the transition of physical processes and equipment shifts, for
example a capital good sale (buy a ship, buy equipment on a ship) to a solution sale
(buy the services of a ship, buy the services of the equipment on the ship including
real-time monitoring and when necessary (remote) maintenance). This transition is
ongoing across all transport modes. For the FIoS to function properly all entities
defined as FIoSR must be able to act as computational units. Critically these units
require the capability of a ‘networked identity’, hence the push for encrypted data on
certificates that is comprised of harmonized data elements that can be interoperable in
the various software tools in the myriad business processes of the global shipping value
chain.
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9. Conclusion and Recommendations
In conclusion, this paper has presented the transition of ship certificates from paper to
digital formats, which is taking place at a rate and volume that is inferior to the digital
ambitions of the IMO and e-government adoption in the public sector as a whole.
While poor penetration of e-government in maritime administrations may be explained
in part by budget prioritization, it is also a reflection of a digital leadership deficit in
shipping and its decision-making bodies. To ensure IMO targets for the ‘electronic
clearance of vessels’ are realized, a program management approach with multi-country
indicators, platforms and tools, is needed. Sample existing tools, and suggestions for
new indicators have been provided.
This paper has illustrated that e-certificates for ships as an e-government program can
accelerate administrative procedures, ensure more complete data capture, and better
control implementation, while also generating measurable economic benefits for
shipowners. Although the technical solutions are deployed by the MA, stakeholder
engagement and adoption are essential for success and need adequate attention through
effective change management procedures. Select approaches to e-certificates by IMO
Member flag States, their ROs, and port States and their PSCO inspection activities
have illustrated the status quo as at publication.
The conclusions reached suggest that ‘first mover’ IMO Member States have
succeeded. E-certificate adoption could benefit from closer ties between maritime
administrations and their national e-government initiatives. Global implementation
could be accelerated with large scale multi-country deployments. The following
recommendations are offered on the basis of the research and findings of this paper:

1. E-Certificate Public Private Partnership: launch an initiative with fewer than
15 members (including CLASS, Shipowner representatives, and MAs)
committed to a 24 month time frame to ‘kick-start’ e-certificate deployment in
the shipping industry (possibly focus on Commercial Vessels to start), while
following relevant parts of the ISA2 architecture and the TOOP methodology.
This could mimic the Global Maritime Energy Efficiency Partnerships
(GloMeep)
http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/17GIA-GloMeep-launch.aspx
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2. Global e-Maritime Maturity Index: supported by the IMO, academia and/or
industry, generate an annual ‘e-maritime maturity index’ for all member states,
including enabling technology measures such as smartphone penetration,
connectivity access, and corruption measures from Transparency International.
(This may have a knock-on implication for the IMO Member State Audit
Scheme).
3. Global Maritime Connectivity Index (GMCI), opportunity for a sponsored
indicator of digital connectivity in major global ports and the 200 nautical mile
limit associated to the location, starting with EU 100 ‘Core Ports” expanded
to top 100 ports globally, and eventually at least one major port per IMO
member state. Could be a vendor led initiative.
4. IMO Technical Assistance: leverage UNEDI, UNAP and UNDES egovernment programs in IMO Member States. Maritime Administrations ,
making the linkage between successful e-government programs and Maritime
Administrations that are not yet digital.
5. World Maritime University: incorporate digital technologies, e-skills and
project management in all disciplines in order to heighten the digital
competence of the shipping industry. The MLP specialization to have
dedicated e-government content so that students link their policy and legal
activities to the electronic age.
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Appendix 1: Physical Inspection of Ship Certificates & Documents

Danish Port State Control officer inspecting ship certificates
(Danish Maritime Authority, 2018)

(Abuja Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control, 2015)
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Appendix 2: Sample Certificate of Registry, Kingdom of the
Netherlands
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Appendix 3 : Vessel Registration in Liberia

(Liberian Registry, 2016)
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Appendix 4: Ship Certificates Issued Electronically

Table provided on next page due to margins
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(VISMA Consulting a/s, 2017)
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Appendix 5: ISA2 Reference Architecture for E-Documents

Source: European Commission ISA2 (JoinUp, 2016)
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Appendix 6 : MA Press Releases and Maritime Announcements
BAHAMAS MARITIME AUTHORITY Information Bulletin 20180129
http://www.bahamasmaritime.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/173-ElectronicRecord-Keeping-Rev1.pdf
DNV-GL Electronic Class and Statutory Certificates
https://www.dnvgl.com/maritime/electronic-certificates/index.html
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF SHIPPING E-cert
announcement 20171218
http://www.irclass.org/technical-circulars/dgs-engineering-circular-no-07-of-2017reg-issuance-of-statutory-certificates-by-recognized-organizations-in-electronicformat/
IMO FAL.5/Circ.39/Rev.2 20 April 2016
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Facilitation/Electronic%20Business/Documents/F
AL.5-Circ.39-Rev.2%2020Guidelines%20For%20The%20Use%20Of%20Electronic%20Certificates%20(Sec
retariat).pdf
KINGDOM OF DENMARK e-certificate announcement press release 20160620
https://www.dma.dk/Presse/Nyheder/Sider/Danish-ships-to-be-issued-with-digitalcertificates-.aspx
MARITIME AND PORT AUTHORITY OF SINGAPORE electronic certificate
announcement 20161130
https://www.mpa.gov.sg/web/portal/home/port-of-singapore/circulars-andnotices/detail/1534abe4-6693-4b16-a980-c1851f07322e
PANAMA MARITIME AUTHORITY Merchant Marine Circular 20170830
http://www.segumar.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/MMC-355-USE-OFELECTRONIC-CERTIFICATES-ONBOARD-30-AUGUST-2017.pdf
PARIS MOU Guidelines on the use of electronic certificates
http://www.classnk.or.jp/hp/pdf/activities/portal/ecert/guideline/PSC_paris_mou.pdf
TRANSPORT MALTA Merchant Shipping Notice 20171026
http://www.transport.gov.mt/admin/uploads/medialibrary/files/MS%20Notice%20139-%20Use%20of%20electronic%20certificates.pdf
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Appendix 7: Fleet Ownership & Registration, Main Economies, 2017
Economy of
ownership
(Ranked by
number
of ships owned)

Flag of registration
(Ranked by number of ships registered)

Panama

China

Liberia

Marshall
Islands

Singapore

China,
Hong
Kong
SAR

Malta

World

China

559

3 256

41

28

51

770

20

5 206

Greece

420

0

842

820

37

21

622

4 199

2 225

0

156

146

123

68

8

3 901

Germany

29

0

904

176

58

20

177

3 090

Singapore

222

1

136

123

1 486

108

12

2 599

United States

99

0

93

386

9

68

29

2 106

Norway

55

0

41

138

88

33

88

1 842

Indonesia

21

1

6

1

12

3

0

1 840

Russian Fed’n

28

0

122

4

2

1

32

1 707

534

0

1

222

3

22

5

1 656

6 543

3 323

3 251

3 125

2 641

2 320

2 052

50 155

Japan

R. of Korea
World

Sources: UNCTAD(UNCTAD, 2017a); Clarksons Research./Note: Commercial
ships = > of 1000 gt
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Appendix 8 IMO RESOLUTION MSC.428(98)
RESOLUTION MSC.428(98)
(adopted on 16 June 2017)
MARITIME CYBER RISK MANAGEMENT IN SAFETY
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
THE MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE,
RECOGNIZING the urgent need to raise awareness on cyber risk threats
and vulnerabilities to support safe and secure shipping, which is
operationally resilient to cyber risks,
RECOGNIZING ALSO that Administrations, classification societies,
shipowners and ship operators, ship agents, equipment manufacturers,
service providers, ports and port facilities, and all other maritime industry
stakeholders should expedite work towards safeguarding shipping from
current and emerging cyber threats and vulnerabilities,
BEARING IN MIND MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3 on Guidelines on maritime cyber
risk management approved by the Facilitation Committee, at its forty-first
session (4 to 7 April 2017), and by the Maritime Safety Committee, at its
ninety-eighth session (7 to 16 June 2017), which provides high-level
recommendations for maritime cyber risk management that can be
incorporated into existing risk management processes and are
complementary to the safety and security management practices
established by this Organization,
RECALLING resolution A.741(18) by which the Assembly adopted the
International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for
Pollution Prevention (International Safety Management (ISM) Code) and
recognized, inter alia, the need for appropriate organization of
management to enable it to respond to the need of those on board ships
to achieve and maintain high standards of safety and environmental
protection,
NOTING the objectives of the ISM Code which include, inter alia, the
provision of safe practices in ship operation and a safe working
environment, the assessment of all identified risks to ships, personnel
and the environment, the establishment of appropriate safeguards, and
the continuous improvement of safety management skills of personnel
ashore and aboard ships,
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1 AFFIRMS that an approved safety management system should take into
account cyber risk management in accordance with the objectives and
functional requirements of the ISM Code;
2 ENCOURAGES Administrations to ensure that cyber risks are appropriately
addressed in safety management systems no later than the first annual
verification of the company's Document of Compliance after 1 January 2021;
3 ACKNOWLEDGES the necessary precautions that could be needed to
preserve the confidentiality of certain aspects of cyber risk management;
4 REQUESTS Member States to bring this resolution to the attention of all
stakeholders.
Source: International Maritime Organization
MSC 98/23/Add.1 Annex 10, page 1
I:\MSC\98\MSC 98-23-Add-1.docx
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